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Note
Punishing the Pettifogger’s Practice: Applying
the Sanction Power of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law
Firms
Joseph T. Janochoski∗
As is likely the case in most fields, the legal profession will
inevitably suffer from the occasional bad lawyer, a pettifogger. 1
The pettifoggery that such lawyers occasionally unleash upon
the judiciary can vary from the rather insignificant, 2 to situations arguably deserving of stern condemnation.3 Such behavior
impacts the judicial system in at least two ways: improper attorney conduct undermines the public’s faith in the justice system,
∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like
to thank Professor Bradley Clary and the invaluable staff of the University of
Minnesota Law Library for helping me shape this Note into its final product.
Thanks also to Hannah Nelson, Frank Guenthner, and Taylor Mayhall for their
feedback, and to Jessi Sharpe, Charles Niemann, Sarah DeWitt, and David
LaBerge for their invaluable editing skills. Finally, I would like to thank my
family for their continuous, overwhelming support. Copyright © 2018 by Joseph
T. Janochoski.
1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a pettifogger as “a lawyer lacking in education, ability, sound judgment, or common sense,” or alternatively, “a lawyer
who clouds an issue with insignificant details.” Pettifogger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. See generally Adam Liptak, Judge Finds a Typo-Prone Lawyer Guilty
of Bad Writing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/
us/judge-finds-a-typo-prone-lawyer-guilty-of-bad-writing.html (reducing a
plaintiff ’s lawyer ’s award of fees due to unintelligible prose and arguments in
his submissions to the court).
3. A recent example of insidious pettifoggery can be seen in the Prenda
Law copyright trolling enterprise, where two attorneys filed lawsuits against
thousands of defendants across the country accusing them of illegally downloading pornographic movies. After subpoenaing the identity of subscribers behind
IP addresses suspected of the downloads, the attorneys sent threatening letters
that usually induced the defendants to settle “either out of fear of humiliation
or inability to pay for litigation. . . . Each defendant would typically pay around
$4,000.” Both attorneys were later found to have “engaged in abusive litigation,
fraud on courts across the country, and willful violation of court orders.” See Joe
Mullin, Prenda Lawyers Lose Key Appeal, Will Pay $230k Sanction, ARSTECHNICA (June 10, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/appeals-court
-upholds-sanctions-against-prenda-law-copyright-scheme.
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and it undermines the role of an attorney as an officer of the
court. 4
In order to minimize any damage to the justice system or the
public, courts rely on a “panoply of procedural and substantive”
tools and approaches that can be utilized to discourage and deter
attorney misconduct. 5 One such tool, found in a variety of authorities,6 is the ability of courts to sanction individual attorneys. Sanctions against attorneys, as one court recognized, are
crucial to preventing abuses in litigation and promoting the efficient administration of the entire judicial system. 7 Abuses of the
litigation process can lead to delay, and delay causes hardship

4. See generally Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs, Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1173
(10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ttorney misconduct both implicates the attorney’s fitness
to function as an officer of the court and triggers the court’s responsibility to
protect the public from unscrupulous or unqualified practitioners.”); Cannon v.
Loyola Univ. of Chi., 676 F. Supp. 823, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (“Attorneys are officers of the court, and their first duty is to the administration of justice.”). Punishment of such misconduct is crucial in order to maintain positive public perception of the profession. See Jennifer M. Kraus, Comment, Attorney Discipline
Systems: Improving Public Perception and Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 273, 289 (2000) (noting that “the attorney discipline system[s] must continually combat criticism with policies that inspire public confidence”); Staci Zaretsky, Lawyers: The Most Despised Profession in America, ABOVE THE LAW
(July 15, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/lawyers-the-most-despised
-profession-in-america (describing the legal profession as one the public routinely classifies as the least contributive to society’s well-being).
5. Indeed, this panoply of tools includes Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as various discovery rules. Furthermore,
“[j]udges can supplement these rules with their own creative responses using
the court’s inherent power.” Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2004) (discussing the attitudes of the judiciary
regarding confronting attorney misconduct and the tools available to judges in
that capacity).
6. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (recognizing, though not for the first time, the inherent power of courts to sanction attorneys who litigate in bad faith or abuse the litigation system). See also FED. R.
CIV. P. 11 (authorizing a court to sanction an attorney who signs a “paper ” lacking any basis in existing law, fact, or a good faith argument for the modification,
reversal, or extension of said law); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f ) (authorizing courts to
sanction a party or a party’s attorney who fails to attend pretrial conferences);
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (authorizing sanctions against parties or a party’s attorney
for particular discovery abuses); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (authorizing sanctions for
failing to comply with discovery orders); FED. R. APP. P. 38 (authorizing sanctions against a party or a party’s attorney for frivolous appeals).
7. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1267 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that
severe abuse of the litigation system may lead to appropriately severe sanctions).
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on both the courts and the litigants. 8 Consequently, while sanctions are ideally a rare remedy,9 they serve an important role in
preventing delay from plaguing the judiciary.
An important source of sanction power is 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
the federal statute that allows a court to require “any attorney
or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States” to “satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred” from conduct that “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 10 The statute, first enacted in 1813,11 was originally designed to prevent attorneys from filing multiple lawsuits where
one suit would suffice. 12 Over time, the statute’s text and underlying purpose have been expanded to include—and perhaps even
primarily target—a multitude of delay-inducing activities in
which attorneys engage. 13 Indeed, in § 1927’s most recent
amendment, Congress explained that its purpose in amending
the statute was to “expand[] the category of expenses the judge
might require an attorney to satisfy personally” to address dilatory conduct. 14
Recent developments in how modern law firms function,
however, pose problems for the effectiveness of § 1927’s sanction
power to deter delaying tactics. As the legal profession has
8. See O’Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581 (N.D.
Ill. 1960) (“Delay causes hardship . . . brings our courts into disrepute . . . [and]
results in deterioration of evidence through loss of witnesses, forgetful memories and death of parties and makes it less likely that justice will be done . . . .”).
9. Constant use of sanctioning power can cause a chilling effect on the
“paramount principle of free access to the courts” by presenting such a potent
threat to uncertain litigants that they may not bring the claim in the first place.
See David Allen Shaneyfelt, Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys,
20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441, 445 (1984). Access to the courts remains important, as even “[a] man with a poor case is as much entitled to have it judicially determined by usual legal processes as the man with a good case.” Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 132 P.2d 297, 302 (1942).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
11. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 19, 21 (current version codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
12. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813) (noting the need for a “Legislative provision” to “prevent multiplicity of suits” where a single lawsuit or process “might
suffice for the administration of justice”).
13. For example, in 1980 Congress amended § 1927 by adding to the phrase
“excess costs” to “expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of
such . . . conduct.” The purpose of these additions was “to deter unnecessary
delays in litigation.” See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234, at 8 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).
14. Id.
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evolved, it has become increasingly specialized.15 This specialization has been driven by increased demand for legal services;
law firms seeking to tap into this demand have chosen to market
their legal expertise by highlighting their specializations. 16 Specialization, particularly in commercial firms, has led to the decline of individual attorney autonomy and the increased emulation of a corporate structure, 17 which in turn decreases
individual attorney autonomy over particular client matters. 18 It
is here where the modern practice of law presents a problem for
§ 1927’s effectiveness: on its face, the statute’s language seeks to
sanction individual attorneys for their dilatory conduct, but the
modern reduction in individual attorney autonomy over particular client matters indicates that even if an attorney is a signatory
on a motion or request, it is more likely the law firm as a whole
that has pursued the dilatory conduct. 19 In such a situation,
sanctioning the individual attorney does little to prevent delayinducing conduct. Furthermore, sanctioning the law firm as a
whole appears, on its face, to be outside § 1927’s purview.20

15. Richard Moorhead, Lawyer Specialization—Managing the Professional
Paradox, 32 LAW & POL’Y 226, 227 (2010) (noting that specialization within the
legal profession is both “well established” and “growing in impact”).
16. Id. at 228 (noting that “elite law firms solidify their position [on the
market] . . . by expanding and underlining their reputation for excellence
through that process of specialization.”).
17. See id. at 229 (“In commercial firms, specialization is said to have advanced alongside a decline in lawyer autonomy while commercial lawyers become wealthier . . . and increasingly emulate the business structures of their
clients.”).
18. See id. (noting specializations parallel development alongside decline in
attorney autonomy). See also Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms,
25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 339, 360 (2009) (noting that specialized firms tend to increase the division of labor across individuals).
19. Indeed, in some cases, misconduct is the underlying result of structural
or cultural pressures within a firm. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 100–01 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2016).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The law firm, on its face, is arguably not a person for
the purposes of § 1927. However, modern day conceptions of corporations as
“moral” persons suggest that as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is plausible that a law firm emulating a corporate structure could be considered a person under § 1927. See, e.g., Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person,
16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (laying the philosophical groundwork for a theory that allows treatment of corporations as members of the moral community,
“of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged residents: biological human beings, . . . [and therefore making] responsibility ascriptions [to corporations] perfectly proper.”).
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This problem has manifested in a federal circuit split pertaining to the scope of § 1927.21 The Courts of Appeal for the
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have all held that § 1927 cannot be used to sanction law firms, 22 whereas the Courts of Appeal
for the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel,
have all held that § 1927 may be used to sanction law firms.23
The Supreme Court has yet to take up the issue, which renders
§ 1927’s application inconsistent nationwide. Such inconsistency
in application is particularly disconcerting considering the rise
of national and international law firms that operate on a nationwide basis.24 If, for example, a highly specialized international
law firm with a broad division of labor and low individual attorney autonomy is litigating in numerous courts around the country, the potential dilatory tactics on the part of the firm may go
unaddressed. Furthermore, even if such tactics are addressed by
21. This problem has been explored in the past, albeit at a time when the
circuit split was less pronounced. See generally Jessica A. Winn, Note, A Firm
Law for Sanctions: Taking a Stance on Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Should Apply
to Law Firms, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2135 (2016). That note explored possible
remedies for resolving the circuit split by proposing that circuit courts align
their positions, encouraging the Supreme Court to review the issue, and proposing statutory language changes to encompass law firms. Id. at 2176–84. This
Note, on the other hand, expands the existing literature by analyzing more recent decisions that have widened the circuit split. Furthermore, this Note argues that statutory interpretation principles, the purpose of § 1927, changes in
how modern law firms operate, and ethical considerations all counsel applying
the statute to law firms. See also Kevin C. Kifer, Law Firms Are People, Too?
Law Firm Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Strained Reading of “Person”, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 547 (2017) (taking the position that the language of
§ 1927 does not encompass law firms); Vincent J. Margiotta, Note, Affirming
Firm Sanctions: The Authority To Sanction Law Firms Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 265 (2017) (taking the position that a Congressional
amendment, or the use of inherent authority, should be the primary method of
resolving the circuit split).
22. See generally Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir.
2015); FM Indus. Inc., v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010);
Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009).
23. See generally Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir.
2011); Smith v. Grand Bank & Tr. of Fla., 193 F. App’x 833 (11th Cir. 2006); Lee
v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001); LaPrade v. Kidder
Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus
Ltd., 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985); MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545
B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
24. James F. Holderman, Section 1927 Sanctions and the Split Among the
Circuits, LITIG., Fall 2005, at 44, 47 (noting “[t]he need for consistency in the
application of Section 1927 is heightened by the proliferation of national and
international law firms and the ever-increasing mobility of the trial lawyers
who litigate in courts throughout the country”).
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the circuits that permit sanctions against law firms under
§ 1927, the inconsistent nature of the statute’s application presents only a patchwork solution to the problem. The lack of a
uniform application of § 1927 may also have the effect of chilling
zealous advocacy on a nationwide basis.25
This Note argues that the historical development and purpose of § 1927, coupled with modern statutory interpretation,
policy, and ethical considerations, supports reading § 1927 as enabling sanctions to be levied against law firms. Part I presents
an overview of the historical formation and purpose of § 1927,
tracing the statute from its 1813 roots through its various iterations, leading up to its modern-day language. Part II explores
and analyzes the reasoning and positions of the above-mentioned circuit split over whether § 1927 may be used to sanction
an attorney’s law firm. Part III argues that innovative statutory
interpretation principles, forward-looking policy surrounding
the treatment of corporations and businesses as persons, and
strong ethical considerations pertaining to zealous advocacy
calls for § 1927 to be interpreted as permitting sanctions against
a law firm. In short, this Note argues that in light of the modern,
specialized practice of law, and the way modern law firms function, law firms should necessarily be considered persons under
the purview of § 1927.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF 28 U.S.C. § 1927
To understand the modern version of § 1927, it is essential
to trace its history back to its original enactment. Section A explores the statute’s original enactment, Section B traces the historical development of the statute, and Section C evaluates
§ 1927’s current language and status. By following the statute’s
gradual growth and expansion over the last 200 years, this analysis suggests that the purpose of § 1927 is to provide a broad
remedy to address dilatory conduct and increased costs in litigation.

25. Id. (“[T]he adoption of one standard for the application of Section 1927
would otherwise assist in allowing busy trial attorneys, who also have a duty to
zealously advocate for their clients, to know with greater certainty what is and
is not acceptable behavior in the federal district courts of all 94 districts, regardless of location.”).
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A. THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORIGINAL § 1927
Over 200 years ago, Congress passed an act designed to prevent parties from recovering the costs incurred in filing numerous lawsuits “whenever there [are] several actions or processes
against persons who might legally be joined in one action or process, touching any demand or matter in dispute before a court of
the United States.” 26 The Act gave federal courts the broad
power to consolidate actions for the purposes of avoiding unnecessary costs or delays,27 and specifically prohibited recovery of
the incurred costs of more than one joinable action “unless special cause” for filing several actions is “satisfactorily shown on
motion in open court.” 28 In an effort to deter this behavior in the
first place, the Act also stated in Section 3 that “if any attorney
. . . or other person admitted to manage and conduct causes in a
court of the United States” appears to have “multiplied the proceedings in any cause before the court” in such a way as to “increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously,” that person “may be
required by order of court to satisfy any excess . . . costs so incurred.” 29
The 1813 law was the first formulation of what would later
become § 1927, and was designed to prevent multiple lawsuits
where a single suit would suffice.30 It would be another twentynine years, however, before a more detailed explanation of the
Act’s primary purpose would be provided. In 1842, in response
to the request for a study on the judicial expenses of the United
States, the Secretary of the Treasury published a letter to the
House of Representatives which mentioned the 1813 law. 31 In
that letter, the Secretary detailed the practices of certain United
States district attorneys who, to increase their compensation,

26. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 1, 3 Stat. 19, 19–20.
27. Id. § 3 (noting the federal courts may “make such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the principles and usages
belonging to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay . . . and accordingly
causes may be consolidated”).
28. Id. § 1.
29. Id. § 3.
30. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813) (noting the need for a “[l]egislative provision” to “prevent multiplicity of suits” where a single lawsuit or process would
suffice).
31. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842).
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filed numerous and unnecessary lawsuits. 32 The statute’s purpose was to counteract such practices and rein in the judicial
costs of the United States, though according to the Secretary the
provision was, at the time, “insufficient to prevent the abuses or
mischiefs which have occurred. ” 33 Consequently, at its very beginning, the congressional purpose underlying the language
later incorporated into § 1927 was to prevent attorneys from unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying both the costs and sheer
number of lawsuits in litigation.
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF § 1927
The 1813 law was not addressed again until 1853, when
Congress returned to the problems facing the federal courts. In
an act setting comprehensive fees and costs for all federal actions, Congress reenacted substantially the same language of the
1813 act. 34 In 1901, Congress moved the provision to Section 982
of the Revised Statutes, but retained substantially the same language enacted in the 1853 act. 35 The language remained the
same up until 1948, when Congress modified the text to make it
clear that the increased costs from any unreasonable and vexatious conduct that multiplied proceedings were to be assessed
against the attorneys themselves, not clients.36 Specifically, Congress modified the statute to read: “Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally such excess costs.”37 This change was based on Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, which held that the purpose
behind the “vexatious” statute was to punish attorneys who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied legal costs, rather than
the parties to the suit.38

32. Id. This letter was also noted by the Supreme Court in a 1980 decision
interpreting the 1980 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 n.6 (1980).
33. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 21.
34. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161, 162.
35. COMPILED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1901, tit. 8, ch. 18, § 982
(Mallory 1902).
36. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 123, 62 Stat. 869, 957 (1948) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
37. Id. (emphasis added). Congress also moved the statute to its current
position, title 28, in the United States Code.
38. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63 (2d Cir. 1912). The
House Report explaining the amendment stated that, unlike the general phra-
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The language of the statute remained untouched until 1980
when, in response to a narrow interpretation handed down in a
Supreme Court case, Congress expanded the costs that could be
assessed against attorneys who violated the statute’s provisions.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, which interpreted the word “costs” in § 1927 as not including attorney’s fees.39 In response to Roadway Express, Congress
amended § 1927 by modifying the kinds of costs able to be assessed to include “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such [unreasonable and vexatious]
conduct.” 40 The legislative history behind the change explained
that the purpose of the modifications was to “broaden the range
of increased expenses which an attorney who engages in dilatory
litigation practices may be required by the judge to satisfy personally.” 41 In light of the Piper decision, Congress wanted to ensure that if an attorney did violate the existing standard covering the dilatory conduct, and “by such conduct cause[d] the other
parties to incur expenses and fees” that would not have occurred
without said violation, the attorney should be “required to satisfy personally [the] full range of excess costs attributable to such
conduct.” 42 In short, Congress expanded the kinds of costs that
could be assessed personally against the attorney responsible for
the offending conduct in an effort to give § 1927 broad reach.
C. THE CURRENT STATUS OF § 1927
Congress has not modified or moved § 1927 since the 1980
amendments discussed above. The statute reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by

seology changes, the word personally was “inserted upon the authority of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 1912, 201 F. 63.” H.R. REP. 88-308, at A164
(1947).
39. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761–62 (1980).
40. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 § 3, § 1927, 94 Stat.
1154, 1156.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234, at 8 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). The Conference Report
noted that § 1927 referred, prior to the amendments, to “excess costs,” which
was a phrase “construed to cover only the narrow category of taxable costs, such
as filing fees.” Id. The fact that Congress acted on this statute the same year
that the Supreme Court handed down Piper suggests that the narrow construction referred to in the legislative history was the Supreme Court’s narrow construction in Piper.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 43

Congressional modifications to the statute over time have
expanded the kinds of costs that courts can assess against individual attorneys. Perhaps as a result of the lack of congressional
attention the statute has received, § 1927 has found a place at
the center of a wide circuit split pertaining to its application to
law firms.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER PUNISHING LAW FIRMS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Almost all the federal circuit courts have weighed in on
whether § 1927 applies to law firms. While the reasoning in each
court varies slightly, the disagreement appears to center around
ascribing literal authority to the exact text of the statute, as opposed to contextualizing the reasoning and purpose of the statute into the modern practice of law. The Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals all hold that § 1927 does not
permit the imposition of sanctions against a law firm, 44 whereas
the D.C., Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Courts of Appeals,
along with the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, have
all held that the statute may apply to law firms.45 Section A of
this Part explores the reasoning employed by the Circuits who
have rejected the use of § 1927 to punish law firms, while Section
B analyzes the reasoning used by the Circuits who have supported the use of § 1927 to punish law firms. Ultimately, the differing treatment the statute has received illustrates the need for
a circuit reconciliation.

43. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
44. See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 799 F.3d 1290, 1290 (9th Cir.
2015); FM Indus. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2010)
(stating that liability under § 1927 is direct, not vicarious); BDT Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 742 (6th Cir. 2010); Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel
Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2009); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414
F.3d 715, 715 (7th Cir. 2005).
45. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 138 (2d Cir.
2011); Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Fla., 193 F. App’x. 833, 838 (11th Cir.
2006); Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 443 (8th Cir. 2001);
LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Baker
Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1985); MJS Las Croabas
Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
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A. CIRCUITS REJECTING THE USE OF § 1927 TO PUNISH LAW
FIRMS
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal
have all held that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanctions against a law firm. Each circuit’s ruling is explored below
in chronological order.
1. The Seventh Circuit Has Held that § 1927 Does Not
Encompass Law Firms
The Seventh Circuit’s holding that § 1927 should not be applied to law firms has been foundational for other circuits. 46 In
Claiborne v. Wisdom, the Seventh Circuit dealt with several
claims filed by an individual alleging she and other similarly situated women had been sexually harassed while they were tenants of the defendant’s property, in violation of federal housing
law. 47 Her complaint represented that the plaintiff and her lawyer interviewed corroborating witnesses before filing suit. 48
However, shortly after removal to federal court, plaintiff moved
to voluntarily dismiss the action because “[t]o the complete surprise and shock of Plaintiff and her counsel, the witnesses denied
making the above-referenced statements and they accused
Plaintiff and her counsel of fabricating the claims.” 49 The district
court dismissed the case with prejudice and granted sanctions
under § 1927 in the amount of $107,846.77 against the plaintiff,
her lawyer, and the lawyer’s firm, all of whom appealed. 50
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sanctions against the
plaintiff and her lawyer, but reversed the sanctions against the
attorney’s law firm. 51 The court noted that § 1927 refers specifically to “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases

46. See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 751; Rentz, 556 F.3d at 396 n.6.
47. See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 717–18.
48. Id. at 718.
49. Id. The district court was unsatisfied with this explanation. As the Seventh Circuit explained, citing the lower court’s opinion, “[the attorney] did not
exhibit the diligence, professionalism, or competency that one would expect
from an officer of the court . . . [h]ad [she] done her job in an objectively reasonable manner, she would have realized that her client did not have a case . . . .”
Id. at 721–22.
50. The district court assessed only one dollar in liability against the plaintiff herself. The remaining amount, $107,845.77, was assessed against her attorney and her law firm after a finding that her law firm was “jointly and severally liable.” Id. at 718.
51. Id. at 717.
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in any court of the United States,” not law firms.52 Furthermore,
the court noted that it was “too much of a stretch to say that a
law firm could also be characterized as [another] person” for the
purposes of § 1927, 53 since only individual lawyers, not firms, are
admitted to practice. 54 In the court’s opinion, the “other persons”
language in § 1927 refers only to those limited circumstances
where “non-attorneys may appear in judicial proceedings, such
as in patent proceedings or where law students receive special
permission to conduct cases before they are admitted to the
bar.” 55 The Seventh Circuit also noted that its reasoning was
consistent with the rationale used by the Supreme Court in
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, which dealt
with whether an earlier version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure could be used to sanction a law firm. 56 In
Pavelic, the Supreme Court construed Rule 11 language that
permitted sanctions only against “the person who signed” the offending document.57 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme
Court held that “[the] context [of] the phrase ‘the person who
signed’ could only mean the individual signer, not his partnership, either in addition to him or in the alternative.” 58 The Seventh Circuit found that the reasoning in Pavelic mirrored its own
reasoning pertaining to § 1927 and threw out the sanctions
against the law firm. 59
In FM Industries, Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Claiborne and its holding that § 1927
52. Id. at 723.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing, among other rules, FED. R. APP. P. 46(a) as an example of a
rule governing the admission of attorneys to conduct cases).
55. Id. (citing, among others, 37 C.F.R. § 10.14, which permits nonattorneys
to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark office).
56. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 120 (1989) (“Rule
11 sanctions may be imposed only upon [the] individual attorney who signs papers and not on attorneys’ law firm.”). As the Seventh Circuit noted, Rule 11
was later amended to explicitly include law firms under its sanction authority.
See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723.
57. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 122–23 (“Just as the requirement of [a] signature
is imposed upon the individual, we think the recited import and consequences
of signature run as to him.”).
58. See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723 (citing Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 122–23).
59. Id. at 723–24. The court noted that, despite its ruling, the record
demonstrated a “close connection between [the attorney’s] actions and those of
her firm . . . it seems that the firm was on notice of the fact that the attorney’s
litigation practice was questionable.” Id. at 724. Still, the court also noted that
other avenues for sanctions, specifically Rule 11 and a court’s inherent power,
were available. Id.
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only applies to individual attorneys. In that case, the Seventh
Circuit faced an appeal from sanctions levied against both the
lead attorney, and a consulting attorney who had worked on the
case.60 The court acknowledged appropriateness of sanctions
against the plaintiff’s attorney,61 but reversed the sanctions
against the consulting attorney.62 Specifically, the court noted
that sanctions under § 1927 are “direct, not vicarious.” 63 Section 1927 “does not require every lawyer who files an appearance
to review and vet” documents filed by other lawyers in the case,
as “[n]either the text of § 1927, nor any decision of which [the
Seventh Circuit is] aware, imposes on any lawyer a duty to supervise . . . another lawyer’s work.” 64 As much as the lower court
may have wanted to impose sanctions across the board, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that “personal responsibility remains essential to an award of sanctions under § 1927.” 65
2. The Sixth Circuit Has Aligned Itself with the Seventh
Circuit and Held that § 1927 Does Not Encompass Law Firms
In two key cases, the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with the
Seventh Circuit and held that § 1927 may not be used to sanction
law firms.66 In the first of these cases, Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel
Industries, Inc., an individual who felt he had been cheated out
of a one percent commission on a lucrative sports-apparel licensing deal sued those who allegedly owed him that commission,
and filed what were ultimately determined to be frivolous
claims. 67 The district court granted sanctions against the two attorneys under both Rule 11 and § 1927, but not the plaintiff or
the lawyers’ firms. 68 On appeal, the defendants alleged that the
district court had abused its discretion by, among other things,
60. FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335, 337–38 (7th Cir.
2010).
61. Id. at 340 (noting that the litigation had been “marked by excessive and
unnecessary filing that richly deserve the label vexatious” and that “[the plaintiff ’s attorneys] objections are quibbles”).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–24).
64. Id. at 341 (noting that “[the consulting attorney] was not hired to [vet
the plaintiff ’s submissions], and no lawyer undertakes such a role for free”).
65. Id.
66. See BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010);
Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009).
67. See Rentz, 556 F.3d at 391–93 (“[R]uling that Rentz’s testimony demonstrated subsequent attorney misconduct warranting sanctions .”).
68. Id. at 394.
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failing to sanction one of the law firms involved under either
Rule 11 or § 1927.69
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to
sanction any law firm involved in the case, noting explicitly, that
“[the statute] authorizes the imposition of sanctions only against
an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.’” 70 The
court cited the Seventh Circuit’s Claiborne case for its position,
and aside from clarifying the standard under which an individual attorney could be sanctioned using § 1927, offered no further
refinement on the rule.71
In the second case, BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., the plaintiff sued Lexmark for, among other things,
the misappropriation of trade secrets related to a printer tray
used in Lexmark printers. 72 Ultimately, the district court determined that the lawsuit “should never have been brought, and in
which no attorney should have persisted,” 73 and imposed sanctions on BDT, its attorneys, and the attorneys’ law firm under
state statutes, § 1927, and its inherent power. 74 BDT, its attorneys, and the attorneys’ law firm appealed on the grounds that
§ 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanctions on a law
firm. 75
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s imposition of
sanctions under § 1927 against the law firm of the plaintiff’s attorney, holding that while the prior Rentz decision offered no additional analysis itself, that panel had cited Claiborne and the
Seventh Circuit’s “well-reasoned explanation of why, under
§ 1927, judges may not appropriately sanction law firms.” 76 The
BDT Products panel further quoted the Claiborne decision extensively, noting that they found the “analysis and reasoning of
the Claiborne court persuasive” and confirmed what the Rentz
court stated in dicta: “28 U.S.C. § 1927 does not authorize the
69. Id. at 391.
70. Id. at 395–96.
71. Id. at 396, n.6.
72. BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 743 (6th Cir.
2010).
73. Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
74. Id. A court’s inherent power to sanction always exists; indeed, “[t]he
sanctioning procedures contained in statutes and court rules merely reflect the
inherent authority of a court to control its proceedings.” J.D. Page & Doug Sigel,
The Inherent and Express Powers of Courts To Sanction, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 43,
46 (1990).
75. BDT Prods., 602 F.3d at 750.
76. Id. at 750–51 (citing Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir.
2005)).
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imposition of sanctions on [a] law firm[].” 77 In particular, the
Court noted that “[e]ven if [a] firm[ ] can admittedly be personified in a literary sense through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under [§ 1927] . . . .” 78 Consequently,
the court vacated the award of attorney’s fees against the law
firm. 79
3. The Ninth Circuit Has Also Held that § 1927 Does Not
Encompass Law Firms
The last circuit to take the position that § 1927 cannot be
applied against law firms is the Ninth Circuit. In Kaass Law v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the plaintiff and her attorney filed a
lawsuit against ten different defendants, including Wells Fargo
Bank, alleging that the defendants had reported adverse information about the plaintiff to credit agencies which reflected negatively on the plaintiff’s credit report.80 Following dismissal due
to pleading defects, Wells Fargo filed a motion to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from the plaintiff and her attorney’s law firm
under § 1927.81 The district court granted the motion with regard to the law firm of the plaintiff’s attorney, finding the firm
had “acted in bad faith by knowingly raising frivolous arguments
against Wells Fargo and other defendants. ” 82
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of
sanctions against the law firm. 83 The Ninth Circuit explained
77. Id. at 751 (noting that “there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under the statute” and “law firms are not ‘admitted’ to ‘conduct cases’ in
court”).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 757. The Sixth Circuit also conducted an extensive analysis of
whether sanctions would have been permissible under the district court’s inherent power, but ultimately concluded that the district court had misinterpreted
Sixth Circuit precedent. Id.
80. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1291 (9th Cir.
2015).
81. Id. at 1292 (filing a motion to recover $11,236.50 in attorneys’ fees and
costs).
82. Id. at 1292–93 (noting that the law firm of the plaintiff ’s attorney“fail[ed] to plead specific allegations or differentiate between defendants in
the Complaint . . . fail[ed] to oppose defendants’ motions to dismiss . . . [and]
fail[ed] to meet and confer or communicate with opposing counsel.” (citation
omitted)).
83. Id. at 1292–93. The court noted that the plaintiff ’s attorney’s law firm
advanced two grounds for appeal: the first was that § 1927 did not apply to law
firms, whereas the second argued that § 1927 only prohibited conduct that “multiplies the proceedings, not for the filing of initial pleadings.” Id. at 1292. Because the Ninth Circuit agreed with the first argument, they did not reach the
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that it had never addressed “whether a law firm may be considered an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases’”
prior to this case, but ultimately concluded after “consideration
of the persuasive reasoning of some of [the Ninth Circuit’s] sister
circuits . . . that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 does not permit the award of
sanctions against a law firm.” 84 The court noted that § 1927 authorizes recovery “only from an attorney or otherwise admitted
representative of a party.” 85 It then went on to extensively quote
both the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Claiborne and the Sixth
Circuit’s adoption of that decision in BDT Products. 86 The Court
observed that Rule 11 now “explicitly allows sanctions ‘on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation,’” whereas § 1927 does not.” 87 In addition,
the Court stated that the principle of statutory construction expressio unius 88 suggests that the “specificity and precision of
§ 1927 allow[s] for sanctions only against ‘attorneys’ or ‘other
persons admitted to conduct cases.’” 89 This specificity, the court
noted, indicates an intention to exclude law firms from the sanction power of § 1927.90 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ reasoning, coupled with the expressio unius principle, was superior to any other sister circuits’ reasoning and held that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of
sanctions against law firms. 91
second. Id. at 1293.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1293 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc.,
799 F.2d 507, 508–10 (9th Cir. 1986) (overturning sanctions against a financial
consultant employed by attorneys representing two of the parties to the suit)).
86. Id. at 1293–94 (emphasizing that in both cases, the court held that a
law firm cannot be considered a person under § 1927 (citing Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005); BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2010)).
87. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
88. The full phrase, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, means “the expression of one excludes others.” The rule serves to apply negative implication
to statutory language, so that “[t]he presence of [a] specific term or specific list
[in a statute] leads to the implication that the legislature intended to include
only what was explicitly stated and no others.” RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 102–03 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
89. See Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)).
90. Id. (citing Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1312–13
(9th Cir. 1992)).
91. Id. at 1294 (noting reasoning from both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits,
and specifically stating that it found “[the Seventh Circuit’s] reasoning persuasive”).
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With regards to other circuit interpretations, the Court took
issue with the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuit’s positions on
§ 1927. The Court criticized the Second Circuit, noting that “[one
panel had] permitted a district court to impose sanctions against
a law firm, but seemed to buttress its reasoning on the inherent
powers of the district court, not on the express language of
28 U.S.C. § 1927.” 92 Such a “conclusory statement[ ],” in the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, “that ‘nothing in the language’ of [§
1927] forecloses the imposition of sanctions against a law firm”
was unpersuasive because the Second Circuit ignored plaintiff’s
citations to Pavelic, Claiborne, and BDT Products, all of which
point to specific language in the statute.93
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found both the Third Circuit
and Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning lacking. It noted that “the
Third Circuit sanctioned a law firm [under § 1927] before Rule
11 was amended to explicitly include law firms, and did not address the limiting statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.” 94 The
Eleventh Circuit’s position was criticized by the Ninth Circuit
for a similar reason; specifically, the court concluded that the
Eleventh Circuit had “conflated the sanctioning powers in two
different rules when it upheld sanctions against lead counsel and
his law firm pursuant ‘to the bad-faith exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, and Rule 11.’” 95 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found no
reason to detour from the Sixth and Seventh Circuit’s conclusions and concluded that § 1927 cannot be used to sanction law
firms.96
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all concluded
that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanctions on law
firm. 97 Each circuit, leaning on each other’s reasoning for support, has taken the position that the express language of the
statute, coupled with the availability of other sources of sanction
92. The Ninth Circuit quoted extensively from Enmon, noting that the
case’s reasoning, and the source of its authority, was somewhat unclear. Id. at
1294–95 (citing Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir.
2012)).
93. Id. at 1295 (citing Brief for Appellant at 49, Enmon v. Prospect Capital
Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2811-cv) 2010 WL 4715535).
94. Id. at 1294 (citing Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209
(3d Cir. 1985)).
95. Id. at 1294.
96. Id. at 1295 (“If Congress had intended to permit federal courts to impose
sanctions against law firms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, it would have included an express authorization to do so in the statute.”).
97. See cases cited supra note 44.
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powers, makes it improper to impose sanctions under § 1927. 98
The reasoning employed by these circuits necessarily rests upon
a deliberative view of statutory interpretation, which assumes
that the legislature acts as a deliberate body that considers problems and possible solutions critically.99 In this situation, it assumes that the legislature deliberately excluded law firms from
§ 1927’s reach. 100 In addition, that same underlying reasoning
necessarily “rejects the possibility that the legislature might not
have meant exactly what it said.” 101 In contrast, the circuits that
support using § 1927 to impose sanctions on law firms read the
statute broadly, utilizing a different interpretation. 102
B. CIRCUITS SUPPORTING THE USE OF § 1927 TO PUNISH LAW
FIRMS
Other circuits differ on their view of statutory interpretation
and have thus reached a different conclusion with regards to
§ 1927’s application to law firms. Specifically, the D.C., Second,
Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, along with the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, each permit the imposition of
§ 1927 sanctions against attorneys and law firms. 103 Their reasoning is explored chronologically.
1. The Third Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses Law
Firms
The Third Circuit was one of the earlier circuits to take a
position on the issue, though it did so without providing any actual reasoning for applying § 1927 to law firms. In Baker Industries, Inc. v. Cerberus Limited, the plaintiff, Baker Industries,
sought to enjoin defendant Cerberus from terminating a longterm patent license for the manufacture of smoke detectors. 104
After extended litigation, the district court granted a motion for
sanctions under § 1927 against the defendant’s law firm; the
court found that filing hundreds of pages of objections to a referee decision that both parties had agreed to consider binding
98. See, e.g., Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294–95 (citing the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits as persuasive).
99. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35 (describing the deliberative view
of statutory interpretation).
100. See Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1295.
101. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35.
102. See infra Part II.B.
103. See cases cited supra note 45
104. Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 206 (3d Cir. 1985).
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constituted sufficiently “vexatious to justify the award of attorneys’ fees directly against it under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.” 105 The defendant’s law firm appealed.106
The Third Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions, but
made no mention of why it found it appropriate to apply § 1927
to law firms; the court’s discussion focused entirely on the standard used to apply § 1927. 107 Despite explicitly requiring bad faith
on the part of an offending attorney, the Baker court routinely
referenced the defendant’s law firm throughout the opinion as
the target of the sanctions. 108 Consequently, it appears that the
Third Circuit implicitly stated that the bad faith of a firm’s attorneys is attributable to the law firm as a whole.
2. The Eleventh Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses
Law Firms
The Eleventh Circuit is in accord with the Third Circuit with
respect to § 1927. In Avirgan v. Hull, two journalists and their
lawyers filed a lawsuit against numerous “Central Intelligence
Agency operatives, military intelligence personnel, arm[s] merchants, mercenaries, and Colombian drug lords” alleging RICO
violations pertaining to the Nicaraguan Contra affair. 109 After
two years of discovery, it became clear that the plaintiffs lacked
any real evidence, and that they were aware of their lack of evidence prior to initiating suit.110 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and awarded attorneys’ fees
and sanctions under both § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure against the plaintiffs, lead counsel for
105. Id. at 207–08.
106. Id. at 208.
107. Id. at 208–09 (“We . . . read section 1927 to require a showing of actual
bad faith before attorneys’ fees may be imposed.”). Interestingly, despite explicitly requiring bad faith on the part of an offending attorney, the Third Circuit
routinely referenced the defendant’s law firm (Cravath) throughout the opinion
as the target of the sanctions.
108. Id. at 208–09, 211 (focusing on the bad faith of an attorney’s conduct
but concluding that “Cravath’s post-decision conduct was a flagrant breach of
its stipulation . . . [that] transcend[ed] the bounds of zealous advocacy on behalf
of a client.”).
109. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991). The court also
noted that “[m]ost of the allegations [were] based geographically in Nicaragua,
but some allegations accuse various appellees of anti-Communist operations in
Cuba, Southeast Asia, Iran, and Libya.” Id.
110. Id. at 1581 (“ The attorneys for the plaintiffs, the Christic Institute,
must have known prior to suing that they had no competent evidence to substantiate the theories alleged in their complaint.”). The Christic Institute is a
tax-exempt law firm which funded the litigation. Id. at 1576 n.3.
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the plaintiffs, and the Christic Institute as the official law firm
behind the litigation. 111
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees against both lead counsel, the individual plaintiffs,
and the law firm supporting the litigation. 112 With regards to the
Christic Institute’s status as a law firm, the court noted that
“[s]tatus as a public interest law firm or the nature of a claim
does not confer immunity from attorneys’ fees for bringing and
maintaining frivolous lawsuits.” 113 Consequently, the Eleventh
Circuit implied that for the purposes of § 1927, sanctioning a law
firm is no different than sanctioning an attorney, at least in the
eyes of that particular panel.
This decision was later reaffirmed by the Eleventh Circuit
in Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Florida. 114 There, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that § 1927 permits sanctions against
a law firm. 115 The court cited the Avirgan decision, noted above,
stating that as a result, “this court has implicitly determined
that § 1927 applies to law firms . . . [the court is] not bound by
other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion.” 116 Despite finding that sanctions could be imposed against law firms
under § 1927, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to
not impose sanctions because “the [firm’s] conduct falls short of
the bad faith requirement necessary for sanctions under
§ 1927.”117
3. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Has Held That § 1927
Encompasses Law Firms
The D.C. Circuit has also implicitly applied § 1927 against
law firms. In LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., the plaintiff, a
former employee of Kidder Peabody, sued the company alleging

111. Id. at 1582.
112. Id. at 1583.
113. Id. at 1582–83.
114. Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Fla., 193 F. App’x 833, 838 (11th Cir.
2006) (citing Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1582).
115. Id. at 838 (“Grand Bank correctly argues that § 1927 allows for sanctions against a law firm.”).
116. While the Eleventh Circuit was certainly resolute in its holding, it did
not attempt to explore other circuits’ reasoning. Id.
117. Id. at 839.
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common law and statutory violations stemming from her employment and termination. 118 After a series of vexatious procedural maneuvers, the district court granted sanctions against
the law firm of the plaintiff’s attorney. 119 The firm appealed the
order.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the sanctions, though
none of the arguments advanced by the law firm on appeal dealt
with precluding sanctions under § 1927 against them due to
their status as a law firm.120 Consequently, while the case stands
for the proposition that sanctions may be applied against a law
firm under § 1927, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion lacks any clear explanation of why that is the case.
4. The Eighth Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses
Law Firms
The Eighth Circuit has faced a similar situation; it has applied § 1927 sanctions against a law firm but has not expressly
dealt with the question of whether the statute should be used in
such a way. In Lee v. First Lenders Insurance Services, Inc., nine
automobile purchasers filed a putative class action against numerous defendants, alleging violations of the Minnesota Retail
Installment Sales Act, Minnesota usury laws, the federal Truth
in Lending Act, and RICO. 121 One of the attorneys involved,
Thomas J. Lyons, made the decision fairly far into the litigation
to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class, citing the need
for “more time to file a third amended complaint, complete additional discovery, and reformulate the class certification motion
with the help of new national class counsel.” 122 However, Lyons
never filed a third amended complaint, “effectively abandoning
plaintiffs’ class action allegations.” 123 The district court granted
118. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 900–01 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
119. Id. at 901 (“ The law firm of Liddle & Robinson . . . shall compensate
Kidder, Peabody, & Co., for the vexatious and dilatory tactics of plaintiff ’s counsel in filing ex parte papers in the State Court proceeding.”).
120. The law firm Liddle & Robinson advanced three arguments for vacating
the district court’s decision: (1) the district court abused its discretion; (2) the
district court did not support its order with sufficient findings of fact; and (3)
the district court abused its discretion in awarding an “outrageously unreasonable” figure. All were rejected. Id. at 903–06.
121. Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 444 (8th Cir. 2001).
122. Id. at 444.
123. Id. No reason was given explaining why the suit was abandoned. See
id.
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summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, and when the defendants requested an award of $83,284.64 under § 1927,
granted $15,000 in sanctions. 124
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions
against Lyons’ law firm, noting that Lyons had filed “baseless
class action claims” and numerous motions on those claims before “abandon[ing] the class allegations without explanation.” 125
Such conduct forced the defendants to “incur additional costs to
defend the case as a class action.” 126 Still, the question of
whether § 1927 applies to law firms was not raised on appeal.
Consequently, while the Lee decision stands for the proposition
that § 1927 may be applied against law firms, there is no explanation as to precisely why the statute may be used in such a way.
5. The Second Circuit Has Held, with Explicit Reasoning,
That § 1927 Encompasses Law Firms
The Second Circuit has weighed in on the issue, and unlike
several of the circuit courts discussed above, it has provided far
more of an explanation for its position. In Enmon v. Prospect
Capital Corp., Arnold & Itkin, a Texas-based law firm, appealed
from a judgment sanctioning the firm as a whole for its conduct
in opposing the arbitration of a dispute between its client and
Prospect Capital Corporation.127 Specifically, the law firm “challenge[d] the form and amount of the District Court’s sanctions
on [among other things] the grounds that it improperly . . .
sanctioned the law firm as a whole, rather than sanctioning . . .
[the] individual attorneys who participated directly in the litigation.”128
The Second Circuit disagreed with the firm’s argument and
affirmed the sanctions, holding instead that § 1927 grants courts
the authority to award sanctions against the “‘firm as a whole’
. . . for the ‘actions of various lawyers.’” 129 The court compared
the § 1927 power to the inherent power that a court holds to
sanction litigants, noting that it saw “no reason that a different
124. Id. at 444–45 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)).
125. Id.
126. Id. (holding that “[i]n these circumstances, there was clearly ‘a causal
connection between the objectionable conduct of counsel and multiplication of
the proceedings’” (quoting Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396
(11th Cir. 1997)).
127. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2012).
128. Id. at 147.
129. Id.
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rule should apply to § 1927 sanctions[.]” 130 Furthermore, the
court stated, holding otherwise would “upset a relatively longstanding practice among district courts in [the Second Circuit]”
of applying § 1927 to law firms. 131 In fact, under the circumstances, the Court found it particularly justifiable to impose
sanctions on the entire firm for the actions of one attorney. Itkin,
the lawyer at issue, was a “founding, named partner of a firm
that, according to counsel at oral argument, had ten or fifteen
lawyers during the relevant time period.” 132 As a result, “Itkin’s
actions were indistinguishable from those of Arnold & Itkin as a
firm . . . [and] the firm consistently accepted responsibility for
conducting the underlying litigation.” 133 Ultimately, the Second
Circuit found that “nothing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
. . . [or] case law regarding that statute . . . leads us to think that
the district court was without authority to impose sanctions on
Arnold & Itkin as a whole.” 134 As such, for the Second Circuit,
the issue is relatively settled.
6. The First Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Has Held
That § 1927 Encompasses Law Firms
The most recent court to weigh in on the issue, the First Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (B.A.P.), undoubtedly has the
most in-depth analysis of any of the circuits noted above, on either side of the split. 135 In MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. v.
FDIC, as a result of the misconduct of the Castellanos firm, the

130. Id.
131. Id. (citations omitted). The court also noted that “[e]ven when [district
courts in the Second Circuit] have refrained from imposing sanctions . . . [they
still] have assumed that § 1927 sanctions are available against law firms.” Id.
at 148 n.5 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 148.
133. Id. The Enmon court does not appear to consider these facts dispositive;
rather, the firm’s choice to own the attorney’s actions throughout the litigation
appears to be only a strong factor in imposing § 1927 sanctions on the firm. See
id.
134. Id.
135. Interestingly, there is also a circuit split over whether bankruptcy
courts are “Courts of the United States” for the purposes of § 1927. See generally
Daniel Gill, 6th Cir.: Bankruptcy Courts Can Sanction as “U.S. Court,” BLOOMBERG B.N.A. (June 22, 2016), https://www.bna.com/6th-cir-bankruptcy
-n57982074578. The Sixth Circuit has held bankruptcy courts fall within the
language of the statute. See In re Royal Manor Mgmt, Inc., 652 F. App’x. 330
(6th Cir. 2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017).
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B.A.P. was squarely presented with the question of whether
§ 1927 applies to law firms. 136
In conducting its analysis, the B.A.P. acknowledged the
presence of the circuit split over the question, and noted that
“[t]he statute does not expressly provide for vicarious liability
[against a firm].” 137 After walking through the cases involved in
the circuit split, the B.A.P. narrowed in on Brignoli v. Balch
Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., a district court decision out of the
Southern District of New York. 138 Specifically, the B.A.P. noted
that the district court in Brignoli had set forth a unique analysis
that, coupled with similar cases from the prosanction circuits
above, persuaded the B.A.P. to find that § 1927 applied to law
firms.139 The B.A.P. cited with approval the Brignoli court’s reasoning which noted that although the term “personally” in
§ 1927 “takes on a rather distinctive meaning of ensuring that it
is the attorney personally . . . who is taxed the costs of satisfying
the award the court has imposed to cover the additional costs . . .
[of] vexatious lawyering[,]” the statutory language roping in any
“‘‘other person admitted to conduct cases’ discloses an intended
focus of the legislation on the regulating of those entities who
‘conduct cases,’ a statutory class or category into which law firms
naturally fall.” 140 In essence, because law firms are entities that
“conduct cases,” in line with the language of § 1927, the Brignoli
court held that “[t]he language of § 1927 . . . does not . . . disfavor
requiring a law firm that is ‘conducting cases’ in a court in a
manner that multiplies the proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously to ‘satisfy personally’ the fees and costs reasonably incurred[.]” 141 Such reasoning, the B.A.P. held, was sufficient to
hold § 1927 applicable to law firms, and to uphold the lower
court’s imposition of sanctions against the Castellanos law
firm. 142
136. MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 419 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2016).
137. Id. at 419–20 (citing IRA LEESFIELD & MARK SYLVESTER, 2 LITIGATING
TORT CASES § 20:19 (2014)).
138. Id. at 420 (citing Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
139. Id. at 421 (noting that the B.A.P. “[found] the reasoning of Brignoli . . .
and cases similarly decided, persuasive. We, therefore, conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err when it ruled that § 1927 permits sanctions against law
firms.”).
140. Id. at 420 (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 423 (upholding the lower court’s imposition of sanctions).
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Ultimately, the circuits upholding the application of § 1927
to law firms, all appear to follow (at least with respect to § 1927)
a public service statutory interpretation model that enforces the
statutes underlying purpose of punishing and deterring vexatious conduct. Their interpretations, while perhaps out of step
with the plain text of the statute, align with the view that “legislat[ors] passed each statute to serve the greater good and the
appropriate role for the court is to help the legislature accomplish that goal.” 143 By enforcing § 1927 against law firms, and
leaning on their sister circuits’ implicit or explicit endorsement
of sanctioning law firms under the statute, these courts arguably
assist Congress in implementing the goal of § 1927 by preventing
conduct that unreasonably increased the costs of litigation. 144 Indeed, given the modern practice of law in law firms and considerations of ethical limits on attorney advocacy, these circuits
have reached the correct conclusion.
III. SANCTIONING LAW FIRMS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927
SHOULD BE PERMITTED AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, SOUND POLICY, AND THE
PROMOTION OF STRONG PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Attorney sanctions may not be among the headline-grabbing
topics the Supreme Court usually chooses to hear,145 but the national scale of the current circuit split over § 1927 has far-reaching consequences that warrant the Court’s consideration. 146
Careful review of the positions of the various circuit decisions
discussed above supports favoring the circuits that have imposed
sanctions against law firms under § 1927 in light of principles of
statutory interpretation, sound policy contextualized in the modern practice of law, and the importance of ethical guidelines in a
143. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 36. The public view also holds
that “legislators are primarily motivated by the desire to serve the public.” Id.
144. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842); 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29
(1813).
145. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (holding that the use
of a questionable lethal drug for executions was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (holding that the Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage).
146. The website for the U.S. Courts notes that “[t]he [Supreme] Court usually is not under any obligation to hear [any particular] case[ ] . . . it usually
only does so if the case could have national significance, [or] might harmonize
conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit courts.” Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational
-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (emphasis added).
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profession that may, at times, walk a thin line between zealous
advocacy and improper conduct. Section A argues that innovative principles of statutory interpretation support interpreting
the word “persons” in § 1927 as encompassing law firms. Section
B explains that sound policy underlying changes in the modern
practice of law supports reading the scope of § 1927’s sanction
power to include law firms. Finally, Section C argues that sanctioning law firms under § 1927 gives courts an effective, efficient
tool for policing the line between zealous and vexatious attorney
advocacy on an institutional basis. Ultimately, Part III argues
that it is appropriate and necessary to apply § 1927’s sanction
power to law firms.
A. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION SUPPORT
INTERPRETING THE WORD PERSONS IN § 1927 AS ENCOMPASSING
LAW FIRMS UNDER A PUBLIC VIEW MODEL
Careful consideration of the so-called public view of statutory interpretation, which demands interpretation of statutes in
accordance with the broader greater good behind each statute,
as well as evolving concepts of the word “persons” in the legal
profession, suggests interpreting § 1927 to apply to law firms.
1. The Public View of Statutory Interpretation Aligns with the
Underlying Purpose of § 1927
Interpreting § 1927 in conformance with the greater good
underlying its text is not necessarily the first approach a court
might take to reading the statute. After all, the text of § 1927
currently reads, “Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so multiples
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may
be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs”
arising from such conduct. 147 Under a deliberative view of statutory interpretation, which assumes that the legislature acts to
deliberately exclude that which is not mentioned in a statute, 148
the express language of § 1927 applying costs personally to the
offending attorney—without mentioning law firms—implies
that sanctions under its authority cannot be ascribed to law
firms. However, under the public-view approach to statutory interpretation, which assumes legislators “passed each statute to
serve the greater good” and that “the appropriate role for the
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
148. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35 (describing the deliberative view
of statutory interpretation).
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court is to help the legislature accomplish that goal[,]” 149 express
terms in a statute can be interpreted to allow a reviewing court
to assist the legislature to accomplish whatever goals the statute
sought to achieve. The public view pushes back on a strict textualism approach and attempts to consider the context surrounding the statute’s ideal implementation.
The statute’s original purpose sought to ensure the efficient
administration of justice in the judicial system by punishing attorneys who engage in conduct that unreasonably increases both
the volume and costs of litigation. 150 In fact, the language of
§ 1927 is quite broad; it does not restrict the term vexatious beyond its effect on multiplying the proceedings, nor does it set
forth any clear limitation on the degree of unreasonableness necessary to trigger § 1927’s sanctions. The underlying purpose of
decreasing litigation delays and costs, coupled with broad textual elements designed to achieve that purpose, suggests that
the statute constitutes a rule designed to serve the greater good.
Indeed, as the costs of seeking and receiving justice fall, the ease
of access to the vindication of rights by the public increases. As
such, utilizing § 1927 to impose penalties on firms that vexatiously inhibit access to, and consequently raise the cost of, the
vindication of legal rights enhances the greater good. Indeed, the
purpose and language of § 1927 aligns well with the goals of the
public view of statutory interpretation and favors consideration
under such a theory.
2. In the Context of the Modern Practice of Law, the Word
“Person” in § 1927 Should Be Interpreted to Encompass Law
Firms
While not strictly persons in the eyes of the law, modern legal developments support considering law firms to be persons for
the purposes of § 1927. The statute explicitly applies to “attorney[s] or other person[s] admitted to conduct cases in any court
of the United States[.]” 151 While law firms are not technically
persons, § 1927’s use of the word persons should be read to encompass law firms because (1) modern developments in the law
have shifted towards the view that certain kinds of entities, including law firms, should be considered persons in the eyes of
the law; and (2) in many situations, the actions of a law firm in
149. Id. at 36 (describing the public view of statutory interpretation).
150. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842); 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29
(1813).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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a case are indistinguishable from those of an individual, and indeed may involve many individual people.
The theory that a law firm can constitute a legal person is
not a recent development in legal scholarship: the partnership
that makes up a law firm was considered to be a person, separate
from its individual members, as far back as the Roman Empire. 152 In fact, the concept of a firm as an institution “greater
than the sum of its parts . . . [with its own] legal existence, recognizable identity, and loyalty claims independent of the individuals who may own it or control it” is a fairly popular idea. 153
As discussed above, the Brignoli court built on this foundation
by holding that law firms to fall naturally into the category of
“other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” under § 1927 due to
their unique nature as entities who try cases in courts of the
United States. 154 Far from being novel, the personhood of a law
firm is historically established. 155
Even setting aside the distinct entity that is a law firm, the
actions of an individual attorney working for a law firm may be
indistinguishable from the actions of the law firm itself. The Second Circuit noted in Enmon that part of its justification in imposing sanctions upon the law firm at issue was that the attorney who had engaged in the improper conduct was a “founding,
named partner of a firm that, according to counsel at oral argument, had ten or fifteen lawyers during the relevant time period.” 156 The actions of this named partner “were indistinguishable from those of [the firm itself] . . . [and] the firm consistently
accepted responsibility for conducting the underlying litigation.” 157
152. See William Hamilton Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 CENT.
L.J. 343, 343 (1903) (applying the principle of firm personality as a test for the
distribution of firm assets upon liquidation); see also Teague v. Lindsey, 17 So.
538, 542 (Ala. 1895) (“A partnership in contemplation of law, is an entity distinct from the members who compose it”); Curtis v. Hollingshead, 14 N.J.L. 402,
410 (N.J. 1834) (“A partnership is considered in law as an artificial person, or
being, distinct from the individuals composing it.”).
153. June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 963, 963–64 (2016) (noting that “[p]opular accounts sometimes read [the
Supreme Court’s] Hobby Lobby and similar decisions as conferring rights on the
[corporate] entity. ”).
154. Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
155. The personhood of other business entities, such as corporations, has recently been acknowledged, albeit in the context of First Amendment rights. See
generally, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
156. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012).
157. Id.
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In fact, “[t]he modern, large law firm is not a world of individuals, but rather a team-based workplace.” 158 As a result,
courts have, “as an evidentiary matter,” difficulty assigning
blame to particular lawyers, “each of whom has an incentive to
shift responsibility . . . onto others in the firm.” 159 Indeed, in a
team context, “the probability that [a] particular offending individual faces liability for any wrongful act is relatively low.” 160 In
larger law firms, even the individual signing the various vexatious court documents may not have been the person who actually made the decision that lead to delay and increased costs. As
such, “the difficulty of identifying a single lawyer as the actual
transgressor in the law firm’s team-based setting means that individual-aimed sanctions . . . are basically moot as deterrents.”161 Utilizing a sanction against the firm, however, deploys
§ 1927 in a manner that may actually have an effect. As one author eloquently stated:
Given the evidentiary problems of pinning . . . misconduct on one or
more members of a lawyering team, the reluctance to scapegoat some
lawyers for sins potentially shared by others in their firm, and especially the importance of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure . . . a disciplinary regime that targets only individual lawyers in an era of large
law firms is no longer sufficient. Sanctions against firms are needed as
well. 162

The application of § 1927 to larger law firms also retains the
statute’s ability to strike individuals where the vexatious conduct is truly attributable to one individual, especially in smaller
law firms. Truly individual vexatious actions should necessarily
be sanctioned as such; this Note does not argue otherwise. Rather, courts considering sanctions against a law firm under this
proposed reading of § 1927 should carefully review the context
and nature of the litigation, as well as the vexatious conduct, in
order to determine whether a firm-wide sanction best fits the circumstances.163
158. Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline (hereinafter
“Collective Sanctions”), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336, 2339 (2005).
159. Id. While this source is contextualized in breaches of ethical rules, the
principle arguably remains the same.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2345.
162. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 8 (1991).
163. The exact scope of review that a court should utilize is outside the confines of this Note. As a possible alternative, which should perhaps be considered
by courts considering firm-wide sanctions, at least one author has proposed a
disciplinary scheme where each individual lawyer in the team responsible for
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Ultimately, even where individuals engage in egregious conduct, the nature of the partnership 164 in which they are engaged
indicates that a law firm has the capability of being considered
a person in the eyes of § 1927, or at the very least some sort of
entity equivalent to a person for the purposes of the statute. Imposing § 1927 sanctions against a law firm simply acknowledges
the reality of the modern practice of law, at least in the context
of a large law firm. While firm-wide sanctions under § 1927 may
be a closer question with respect to smaller law firms, ascertaining the context surrounding the vexatious conduct permits a
court to carefully target either the responsible individual, or the
firm as a whole.
B. SOUND POLICY SURROUNDING THE MODERN PRACTICE OF
LAW IN LAW FIRMS SUGGESTS THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST LAW
FIRMS WILL BETTER ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE
Section 1927 should be applied to law firms to ensure that
internal tribalism and absorbed behaviors do not infect a law
firm’s culture. The modern practice of law has evolved immensely in recent years, and the development of massive 2000or-more-person law firms has fundamentally altered the way in
which law is practiced both domestically and on the international stage. 165 No longer is an apprenticeship the primary form
of learning to practice law. The development of large law firms
has given rise to a form of internal tribalism that attorneys
the vexatious conduct faces sanctions unless the group produces a culpable individual. See Collective Sanctions, supra note 158, at 2336. Doing so would ensure that “[t]he responsible group facing punishment [would] be the smallest
identifiable group from which the offense . . . originated.” Id. at 2336–37. While
perhaps viable, such a disciplinary scheme may run into difficulties where individual responsibility is truly lacking, such as when the vexatious action taken
is ingrained in the law firm’s normal litigation strategy.
164. Drawing distinctions between different types of law firm business arrangements (for example, LLCs versus LLPs) under the scope of § 1927’s power
may be necessary for court’s considering sanctions, though this Note does not
explore that possibility. Each business arrangement offers differing benefits to
those involved. See generally Eric Feigenbaum, Limited Liability Partnership
Vs. Limited Liability Company, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/limited
-liability-partnership-vs-limited-liability-company-3736.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2018).
165. Stephen M. Sheppard, The American Legal Profession in the TwentyFirst Century, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 241, 260–61 (2014) (noting that in 2013,
“the largest five [law firms in the United States] were over two thousand attorneys .”). The United States certainly leads the world in developing the law firm
to its logical extreme, at least in terms of size. Id. (citing David Scott Clark,
Legal Professions and Law Firms, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 362, 384–
85 (David Scott Clark ed., 2012)).
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within law firms tend to associate with; specifically, the “law
firms and attorneys who . . . generally represent[ ] one form of
client . . . tend to adopt a worldview contrary to the worldview of
the lawyers representing clients with adverse interests.”166 This
tribalism creates a unique environment in which the attitudes
and norms of senior attorneys, or even a legal-service institution
as a whole, are often absorbed by lawyers employed alongside
those senior attorneys, or within the legal-service institution itself. 167 Indeed, even the American Bar Association has noted
that “the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct
of all its members.” 168
In addition to the uniform ethical atmosphere inside large
law firms, the division of labor inherent within massive law
firms favors attributing individual attorney conduct to the firm
in its entirety. The development of large law firms, coupled with
increases in technology and connectivity, has caused the legal
profession to become increasingly specialized. 169 Coupled with
increased demand for legal services, law firms seeking further
expansion have chosen to market their legal expertise by highlighting their specializations. 170 This specialization has led to
the decline of individual attorney autonomy and the increased
emulation of a corporate structure. 171 The corporate structure

166. Id. at 261. An excellent example of this tribalism can be found in the
different club-like attitudes that characterize the Defense Bar and the “Plaintiff ’s Bar.” Id. At least one author has argued that the isolated nature of individual practice groups in large firms helps alleviate this practice. See, e.g., Kifer,
supra note 21, at 569 n. 172. However, this argument ignores a potential firmwide culture of improper aggressiveness that stems from ethical structures, and
not just practice group structures. A pervasive attitude towards ethics can certainly infect multiple practice groups.
167. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 19, at 12–13 (noting that the absorption
process can occur “even if what is going on around [the attorneys] is inconsistent
with published or official professional norms”).
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
169. See Moorhead, supra note 15 (noting that specialization within the legal
profession is both “well established” and “growing in impact”).
170. Id. at 228 (noting that “elite firms solidify their position [on the market]
. . . by expanding and underlining their reputation for excellence through that
process of specialization”).
171. Id. at 229 (“In commercial firms, specialization is said to have advanced
alongside a decline in lawyer autonomy while commercial lawyers become
wealthier . . . and increasingly emulate the business structures of their clients.”).
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serves to decrease an individual attorney’s autonomy over a particular client matter. 172 That individual autonomy is exactly
what § 1927 targets when it is used to sanction individual attorneys for their own individual conduct. However, the statute’s effectiveness and vitality are substantially diminished when sanctions are imposed against an attorney whose individual conduct
is but one part of a large division of labor within a modern law
firm. Put another way, large modern law firms and their division
of labor renders sanctions against individual attorneys about as
effective as removing one of the mythical hydra’s heads; it might
slow down the creature, but in the end two more heads will grow
to replace the one lost without any real change to the nature of
the creature itself.173
It is also no longer the case that attorneys remain geographically isolated; they can spread pettifoggery nationally—or even
internationally—by simply catching a flight to wherever a hearing is located.174 As one district court judge noted, “More and
more, I look across the bench to see lawyers not just from my
home state of Illinois but also those who are appearing before me
pro hac vice from New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., Miami,
Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, or San Francisco.” 175 This increased mobility undermines one of the most powerful deterrent
effects of sanctions: the reputation of a lawyer in their community. 176 By practicing nationally, the effect of a sanction upon an
attorney’s reputation is dampened through sheer distance. A
sanction against that attorney’s law firm, on the other hand, has
an impact on the reputation of the firm itself. Consequently, using § 1927 against a law firm to reinforce the reputational deterrence of sanction power helps compensate for the national reach
enjoyed in the modern practice of law.

172. Id. (noting specializations parallel development alongside decline in attorney autonomy); see also Garicano & Hubbard, supra note 18 (noting that specialized firms tend to increase the division of labor across individuals).
173. For a general explanation of the properties of a Hydra creature, see Hydra, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Hydra-Greek-mythology.
174. Holderman, supra note 24, at 47 (noting “the proliferation of national
and international law firms and the ever-increasing mobility of the trial lawyers
who litigate in courts throughout the country.”).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 44 (“Although sanctions can impact attorneys’ pocketbooks . . .
perhaps even more powerful is the negative effect that sanctions can have on
an attorney’s standing in the legal community. Sanctions are . . . an official
statement from a court that an attorney . . . [requires] reprimand[ing].”).
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One potentially adverse effect of permitting firm-wide sanctions under § 1927 stems from the typical structure of compensation in a law firm; partners earn the most as a result of their
direct access to firm profits. A firm-wide sanction would disproportionately fall upon partners while almost entirely avoiding
associates, because any firm-wide sanction would be paid out of
the firm’s own pocket, thereby “reduc[ing] a partner’s individual
draw as it eats into firm profits.” 177 Partners may also face personal liability for any shortfall.178 Associates, on the other hand,
remain relatively untouched: associate salaries are typically unharmed by the monetary effects of large financial obligations
such as sanctions, and any reputational harm to the firm is rendered less potent by most associates’ ability to quickly disassociate themselves from vexatious acts by relocating to a different
employer.179
However, rather than consider such an impact to be improper, any disproportionate effect that firm-wide sanctions inflict upon partners should be considered a positive feature of
§ 1927’s sanction power. Indeed, it is the partners, not the associates, that typically cause internal tribalism of the kind that
triggers vexatious sanction-worthy conduct; the attitudes and
norms of senior attorneys are often absorbed by lawyers employed alongside those senior attorneys.180 As such, allowing the
impact of a firm-wide sanction to fall upon partners may actually
achieve the desired deterrent effect precisely because the partners are in the best position to potentially modify the attitudes
and norms of an entire firm.
Ultimately, sanctioning the law firm itself renders the purpose of § 1927 far more effective in the modern legal profession
because it allows a court to directly attack the source of the vexatious behavior and send an institution-wide signal that misconduct will not be tolerated. 181 Furthermore, applying the statute
177. Collective Sanctions, supra note 158, at 2344.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2345.
180. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 19, at 12–13 (noting that the absorption
process can occur “even if what is going on around [the attorneys] is inconsistent
with published or official professional norms”).
181. Consider, for example, a situation where multiple senior partners in a
large law firm direct the activities of a large team of junior associates working
on a case. Those senior partners direct the junior associates to conduct the litigation in a manner considered vexatious and unreasonable. Arguably, the best
use of § 1927 in such a situation would be to target the law firm itself to discourage all senior partners, as well as the junior associates, from pursuing such
strategies in the first place.
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against law firms keeps intact its individual sanction scope;
where an attorney retains substantial individual autonomy over
a case (such as in a smaller law firm, or solo practice), the statute
still permits the imposition of sanctions on an individual attorney. While this distinction may require a court to analyze the
responsibility held by an individual attorney in order to evaluate
the level of autonomy present over a given matter, courts should
not shy from such an inquiry. In fact, in order to ensure that such
vexatious conduct is deterred effectively, courts should embrace
such a task. Applying § 1927 against law firms serves to modernize the statute’s use in line with contemporary law firm practices, while retaining its original scope.
C. SANCTIONING LAW FIRMS REINFORCES A STRONG ETHICAL
GUIDELINE TO ATTORNEYS THAT ZEALOUS ADVOCACY DOES NOT
NECESSITATE UNFOUNDED LEGAL STRATEGIES
The imposition of sanctions against law firms under § 1927
is particularly important in light of the strong possibility (perhaps even inevitability) that lawyers working in large law firms
will absorb and adopt the ethical norms and behaviors of their
peers and superiors. 182 Ensuring the integrity of the legal profession is particularly crucial given the unique role attorneys
have in ensuring “the recognition and protection of rights and
powers in the citizen and in the state”; indeed, “the broad work
of the profession will very likely remain central to American
life.” 183 By enforcing sanctions against law firms under § 1927,
the courts could control a unique tool to curb potential overzealous litigation strategies, particularly in civil discovery. 184

182. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 19, at 12–13 (noting that “lawyers tend
to absorb the ethical norms of the institutions that employ them, even if what
is going on around them is inconsistent with the published or official professional norms”).
183. See Sheppard, supra note 165, at 272. Undermining such a role with
misconduct and vexatious litigation strategies will likely only further the already negative public perception of lawyers. See Zaretsky, supra note 4 (describing the legal profession as one the public routinely classifies as the least contributive to society’s well-being).
184. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 19, at 741 n.132 (noting that “the empirical literature on civil discovery [describes] an arena in which . . . the prevailing legal culture may be particularly directed toward adversary behavior ”). But
see Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529 (1984) (arguing that the prevailing moral view of the
legal profession, which generally ascribes overzealous behavior to attorneys, is
misplaced).
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Such a need is particularly apparent when the realities of
modern firm practice are considered. Many, if not most, of the
tasks performed in large law firms are assigned to teams of lawyers in order to effectuate a relatively efficient work environment. 185 Client appreciation of efficiency aside, teaming up encourages attorneys to take ethical risks that they would not take
individually while obscuring responsibility for the team’s actions
behind a group of individuals united in the common practice of
law. 186 Put simply, while a single lawyer may have “sign[ed] the
complaint or motion, such filings are often the joint product of
‘background preparation and drafting by several attorneys[.]’” 187
Punishing a single lawyer for vexatious conduct that ultimately
stemmed from a team of attorneys does nothing but select a
scapegoat that, upon the rendering of due punishment, leaves
the status quo within the firm untouched. A punishment levied
against the firm as a whole, however, encompasses teams of attorneys who act as one while litigating—a method of sanction
arguably best utilized under § 1927.
Of course, it could be argued that § 1927 is unnecessary in
light of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
inherent power possessed by the judiciary to sanction litigants.
Rule 11’s text explicitly includes law firms within its sanction
power, and a court’s inherent authority arguably serves as a
catch-all to ensure that particularly unethical conduct is not permitted to slip through the cracks. 188 However, there are substantial limitations on the scope of Rule 11’s sanction power that suggest § 1927 should serve as a valid—and perhaps even
desirable—alternative. Rule 11 sanction power is limited to documents signed and filed with the court that bring frivolous
185. Schneyer, supra note 185, at 8.
186. Id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”:
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 386, 395 (1981) (noting that businessmen in role-playing experiments
demonstrated a strong tendency to make riskier choices when decisions were
made collectively). Individual attorneys in law firms usually “commit[ ] ethical
or other infraction[s] . . . to capture some perceived benefit” such as “increased
revenue, increased personal esteem, or the masking of past mistakes.” Collective
Sanctions, supra note 158, at 2340. However, “[t]he team-based nature of the
law firm makes it unlikely that any one lawyer will capture all of the benefit of
a wrongful act.” Id.
187. Schneyer, supra note 185, at 9.
188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also Winn, supra note 21, at 2186 (“In those
rare, narrow cases [where Rule 11 and Section 1927 overlap], it might seem
redundant for both Rule 11 and § 1927 to authorize sanctions against a law firm
because Rule 11 is already available.”).
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claims, whereas § 1927 encompasses all actions that “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply the proceedings. 189 Furthermore,
with respect to any power inherent in a court to sanction and
control individuals appearing before it, courts typically prefer to
use sanction power drawn from current rules.190 Doing so permits the imposition of a clear set of standards to guide both future cases and other lawyers, as opposed to case-specific arguments on why inherent authority necessitates sanctions. 191 As
an ethical guideline to attorneys and firms moving forward, utilizing § 1927 to create a clear set of standards from a national
body of case law provides less uncertainty and more predictability for everyone involved. 192 Indeed, it may trigger a decline in
incidents of pettifoggery.
Using § 1927 as a tool to set clear ethical norms for the legal
profession also aligns well with the principles advanced in the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. 193 Rule 3.1, for
example, states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.” 194 The
Rule attempts to draw a fine line between “the “duty to use legal
procedure for the fullest benefit of the client[]” and “[the] duty
not to abuse legal procedure.” 195 Section 1927 helps courts clarify
the line between client advocacy and abuse of legal procedure by
189. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
190. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 50 (noting that while
“[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from
the nature of their institution” when “there is bad-faith conduct in the course of
litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the [Federal] Rules, the
court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power ”).
191.Winn, supra note 21, at 2159 (“Section 1927 serves an important role . . .
[by] provid[ing] courts with standards for identifying a wide range of sanctionable conduct, including conduct identified in Rules 11 and 37.”).
192. Id. at 2140 (“Law firms, lawyers, and federal courts should be certain
about whether § 1927 sanctions create law-firm liability when frivolous actions
are attributable to the firm.”). Certainty in the legal profession is highly valued:
“Predictability, stability, consistency and transparency are all commonly identified as core components of the rule of law, even though the rule of law is not
incompatible with, and even requires, uncertainty and vagueness.” See Stephen
Tang & Tony Foley, The Practice of Law and the Intolerance of Certainty,
37 UNSW L.J. 1198, 1198 (2014). Indeed, “there are many advantages to this
ideal of certainty . . . [t]he minimisation of arbitrary power and unpredictable
behaviour . . . is something to be treasured and protected in a liberal democratic
society.” Id. at 1199.
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 3.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983).
194. Id.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 3.1 cmt (AM. BAR. ASS’N
1983).
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providing a uniform statutory basis that lawyers and judges can
rely on in the future. Additionally, § 1927 also applies where
claims are not entirely frivolous but are certainly unreasonable
and vexatious. In short, applying § 1927 to law firms adds clarity
and uniformity to existing ethical rules and gives the judiciary a
useful tool in policing the line between zealous advocacy and unethical pettifoggery.

CONCLUSION
Walking the fine line between overzealous and appropriate
advocacy is not always easy; such a balancing act is perhaps even
more arduous when a law firm to which an attorney belongs promotes the kind of tactics § 1927 specifically seeks to prevent. Pettifoggers in the legal profession, especially those supported by
their law firms, impose a heavy burden on the efficient administration of justice. Attorneys who frustrate the smooth administration of justice harm the effectiveness of the judiciary, and
ultimately damage both the clients they oppose, and those they
represent. Indeed, vexatiously prolonging litigation serves only
to undermine the role that attorneys in the United States play
in the vindication of legal rights.
The circuit split regarding the use of § 1927 to curb such
pettifoggery dulls a potentially poignant tool that could be used
to deter such attorney and law firm misconduct on a national
scale. For § 1927 to be effective, an unambiguous national standard must exist to avoid protracted proceedings over the scope of
the statute itself.196 By utilizing broad statutory interpretation
principles, in light of the context of individual attorney autonomy in the modern practice of law and the importance of unified,
clear ethical standards for the legal profession, § 1927 clearly
stands out as a tool best suited to quell pettifoggery before it has
a chance to permeate the legal profession to any greater extent.

196. Glenn J. Waldman, Federal Court Sanctions Against Attorneys Under
28 U.S.C. § 1927, 81 FLA. B.J. 17, 20 (2007) (“Litigation over attorneys’ fees in
the form of sanctions is an undeniable, ever-burgeoning area of federal practice
and demands unambiguous standards to avoid protracted proceedings . . . ‘a request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.’”).

